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The promotion of democracy has often formed a key component of strategies for improving human rights
across the world. Courtenay R. Conrad writes that while this relationship between democracy and
human rights is well established, in practice democratic institutions are not always capable of
constraining human rights violations and in some cases may even make them worse. She argues
that democracy promotion should not be seen as a ‘magic bullet’ for preventing human rights
abuses and that more attention should be paid to potential unintended consequences.
Democracy promotion – a key tenant of European Union and United States foreign policy – is
frequently justified in terms of improving government respect for human rights. This focus on
democracy is for good reason. Scholarly research on government repression consistently finds that democracies
violate the human rights of their citizens less frequently and less violently than non-democracies. The relationship
between democracy and improved human rights is so consistent that scholars often refer to it as the “domestic
democratic peace.” But democracy is not a panacea for stopping human rights violations. My research on
government torture (with Will H. Moore) suggests that democratic institutions intended to limit state repression do
not always constrain human rights violations and may even make them worse.
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT) defines torture as the purposeful inflicting of extreme mental or physical pain by government officials or their
agents. Under this definition, torture includes everything from beatings to electrocution to water boarding to the
deprivation of food and water. Of individual rights to physical integrity – the right not to be tortured, killed,
disappeared, or politically imprisoned by your government – torture is the most common and is reported to have
increased in the last three decades. Although democratic institutions generally improve government respect for
rights, there are three reasons why these institutions often fail to stop torture.
First, institutions like contested elections, freedom of expression, and the institutional separation of powers do not
have any limiting effect on torture when a government faces violent dissent. When governments face dissent, they
almost always respond by violating the rights of their citizens. When we consider some of the reasons that
governments turn to torture – to obtain information from and to intimidate the opposition – it might not be surprising
that such violations occur more frequently when leaders feel threatened. But it is surprising that the positive effect of
democracy on torture prevention completely goes away when governments face dissent. One potential explanation
is that ordinary citizens are less likely to hold the government accountable for human rights violations when they feel
threatened. My preliminary survey research (with Sarah E. Croco, Brad T. Gomez, and Will H. Moore) suggests that
Americans are more accepting of government torture when an individual has an Arabic name, for example.
Second, torture is difficult to stop once it gets off the ground. Once a country starts to torture, it is alarmingly likely to
continue to do so, even when it faces domestic and international criticism for its behaviour. From 1981 to 1999, over
90 per cent of countries that used torture in one year continued to use it in the following year. Institutional separation
of powers – a key component of democracy – can make stopping human rights violations even more difficult.
Executives do not have full control over the use of torture because they delegate its implementation to repressive
agents like members of the military and the police. To eliminate the use of torture at the national level, government
executives would need to monitor and control every member of the military, every police officer, and every
intelligence agent. Maintaining that level of oversight (and the training that often accompanies such oversight) is
very difficult; it means that executives need to implement policies to prevent even one random, bad apple, rogue
police officer from hitting a criminal suspect in an interrogation room.
Democracies face another hurdle that makes stopping the use of torture more difficult. During his initial presidential
campaign in 2008, United States President Barack Obama ran for office in part on a promise to close the prisoner
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detention camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although those camps have not yet been closed, it is not necessarily
because President Obama personally wants to keep them open. The president may prefer to halt the operation of
such detention camps, and if he were a dictator, he would be able to do make that decision unilaterally. But in a
democracy, other institutional actors – like the US Congress, for example – have a say in policymaking. The more
people and institutions that participate in making a policy, the harder it becomes to make changes to that policy. As a
result, once human rights violations like torture begin, they are more likely to continue in countries with separation of
power. Separation of power is something we prize as part of democracy, but in this case, it can have a negative
effect on the protection of human rights. It makes policies that are already going on – like government torture or the
presence of detention facilities at Guantanamo – more difficult to stop.
Third, countries with effective domestic courts are less likely to repress than countries with ineffective judiciaries.
But my research (with Daniel W. Hill and Will H. Moore) suggests that effective courts also encourage executives
and their agents to hide torture rather than stop it completely. Torture techniques fall broadly into one of two
categories. Scarring torture – like beating – marks the victim’s body, while stealth torture – like water boarding – is
executed so as not to leave visible marks on the victim. Allegations of scarring torture are hard for states to deny.
But stealth torture provides the government with plausible deniability because it does not leave marks to
substantiate victim claims. Unlike elections that protect the majority, courts are anti-majoritarian institutions,
protecting even the most marginalised individuals in a society who are often the people being tortured. As such,
when states have effective courts, they want to repress so they do not get caught. While courts may indeed make
governments less likely to torture, they also encourage government leaders and their agents to develop better ways
to hide violations of human rights.
In short, although democracy is associated with increased protections for human rights, it is not a magic bullet and
may have unintended consequences on government repression. Being aware of these unintended consequences is
important if we wish to develop new institutions – like improved training and monitoring programmes for police
officers and prison officials – to improve human rights at the national level.
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